Abstract
Green Supply Chain Management (GSCM) integrates environmental concept into supply chain management, such as, the design of green product. However, manufacturers require high investment to perform R&D green innovation, and the retailers may bear the risk of the consumers' acceptance in the market. Combining the manufacturer's investment of an environmental-friendly green product with the retailer's risk aversion, this paper investigates the optimal decisions of a green supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. Through Stackelberg game model, we use conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) criterion to evaluate the risk-averse behavior of the retailer under stochastic demand. The results show the great impacts of the retailer's risk-averse behavior on the green degree, the wholesale price, the retail price and the order quantity of green products relative to certain key thresholds.
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