Pricing lane changes

Abstract

Risky and aggressive lane changes on highways reduce capacity and increase the risk of collision. We propose a lane-changing pricing scheme as an effective tool to penalize those maneuvers to reduce congestion as a societal goal while aiming for safe driving conditions. In this paper, we first model driver behavior and their payoffs under a game theory framework and find optimal lane-changing strategies for individuals and their peers in multiple pairwise games. Payoffs are estimated for two primary evaluation criteria: efficiency and safety, which are quantified by incorporating driver tradeoffs. After that, the discretionary lane-changing (DLC) model is calibrated and validated by real-world vehicular trajectory data. To manipulate drivers’ DLC behaviors, two types of lane-changing tolls based on local-optimal and global-optimal rules are introduced to align individual preferences with social benefits. We find prices can close this gap and achieve ‘win-win’ results by reducing drivers’ aggressive lane changes in the congested traffic. Meanwhile, the tolls collected can be used to compensate drivers who get delayed when yielding, to encourage appropriate yielding behavior and a pseudo-revenue neutral tolling system.