Abstract
We analyze the incentives of a provider of information goods to offer a proportion of his product for free, when consumers are uncertain about the quality of the good. The provider faces the following trade-off. On the one hand, the free version of the product acts as a partially informative signal; the higher the proportion of the product which is offered for free, that is, the higher the size of the free version, the higher the probability that a consumer will discover the true quality of the good. On the other hand, the higher the size of the free version, the lower the willingness to pay for the remaining parts of the product. In a separating equilibrium, a low quality seller offers no free version and sets the perfect information optimal price, whereas a high quality seller offers a free version of his product to signal his quality. In a pooling equilibrium, both low and high quality sellers propose free versions of their products.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
