Pricing for private charging pile sharing considering EV consumers based on non-cooperative game model

Abstract

The supply of public charging infrastructure is insufficient to meet the charging demand of a large number of electric vehicles (EVs). Private charging pile sharing is an emerging solution to alleviate this imbalance. However, a reasonable price for charging pile sharing has not yet been determined. This study employs a non-cooperative game model to determine a charging pile sharing price considering EV consumers’ charging behaviors. First, a multi-logit model is constructed to measure the probability of EV consumers’ charging behavior choices. Then, a two-matrix game model is established between the private charging pile sharing and public charging mode. Using Beijing as a sample, the sharing rate and price strategies of private and public charging piles are calculated based on the proposed game model. The results show that the optimal sharing rate is 20.01% private charging pile sharing with 1.14 yuan/kWh and 79.99% public charging with 1.7946 yuan/kWh. Sensitivity analysis shows that economics is the most sensitive factor affecting the charging price of private charging pile sharing. Finally, policy recommendations are outlined to improve the private charging pile sharing rate and service efficiency, to broaden the charging options for EV consumers, reduce the construction of public charging piles, and save the government subsidy.