Abstract
The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.
Highlights
As practice indicates, the recycle and reuse of waste products help enterprises to maximize resource utilization and establish good image of society and enable them to create profits [1] and enhance competitiveness [2]
Given the prevalence and importance of the pricing decision problem related to the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with product remanufacturing, it has been studied extensively (Ferrer and Swaminathan [15, 16]; Choi et al [8]; Chen and Chang [17])
Pricing decisions related to the CLSC under uncertain environments have already been considered in the literature (Li et al [24]; Vorasayan and Ryan [25])
Summary
The recycle and reuse of waste products help enterprises to maximize resource utilization and establish good image of society and enable them to create profits [1] and enhance competitiveness [2]. Manufacturers (e.g., Apple and Nike) play a more dominant role than their suppliers and their downstream members (e.g., third-party logistics providers and retailers) in some supply chains, that is, Apple and Nike, are usually considered to be the Stackelberg leader, while the other supply chain members are followers [7] This kind of game model is most common to see in practice, and it has been widely used in the supply chain literature [8,9,10,11,12,13]. (1) How do different channel power structures of CLSCs under uncertain demand of indirect channel influence the wholesale price, the retail price, the direct sale price, the acquisition price of the used product, the transfer price, and the channel performance?.
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