Abstract
In this paper, it considers a two-stage dual-channel supply chain model composed of a risk aversion manufacturer, a risk aversion retailer and a risk-neutral e-commerce platform. Under the condition of information symmetry, it is supposed that the manufacturer is financially constrained. Besides, the analysis is based on Stackelberg game theory. The equilibrium price without capital constraint is compared with the equilibrium price in three cases of e-commerce platform financing, bank loan financing and prepayment financing. Then the effects of risk aversion coefficients of the manufacturer and the retailer on equilibrium prices are compared in four cases. The influence of different financing rates on wholesale price, direct selling price and retail price is analyzed simultaneously.
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