Abstract

Using data on 172 domestic city-pair markets in eight European countries, weinvestigate the effect of the market structure on airlines choices of departuresand prices. We find that flag carriers have a higher number of departures thanother airlines and that it is more likely that flag carriers are monopolists. At thesame time flag carriers do not have a higher ticket price than other airlines. Theinfluence of market power, measured with the Herfindahl index, does not havea significant effect on ticket prices, but a significant effect on the number ofdepartures: decreased market concentration and an increased number of airlinesresults in increased aggregate frequencies. Comparing the predicted ticket prices,at sample mean, between monopoly and non-monopoly routes we can reject thehypothesis of differences in equilibrium price. However, the predicted aggregatenumber of departures, calculated at sample mean, is significantly higher at non-monopoly routes compared with monopoly routes.

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