Abstract
This paper tests for regulation-induced adverse selection in the Massachusetts automobile insurance market during the regulated period 1990-2005. The paper demonstrates the application of the Poterba-Finkelstein (2014) unused-observables test for adverse selection in a regulated insurance market using group-level panel data. Differences between rates that incorporate state-mandated restrictions and those based on actuarial estimates provide data on the unused-observables needed for the test. Consistent with regulation-induced adverse selection, unused observables are statistically significant and positive in estimated models of both insurance purchases and loss costs. Robustness checks support the inference that higher-risk drivers account for the results.
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