Price stabilization or income support? Preferences and cost of programmes

Abstract

Purpose Over the past 25 years, direct cash transfers (often abbreviated as direct benefit transfer, DBT) to the poorer section of the society are gaining popularity over explicit subsidization of prices of essential commodities. One of the main arguments in favor of DBT is that it will cost the government less money and yet, the consumer benefit will be high. This paper aims to examine the proposition critically. Removal of price support exposes the consumers to market risk, and any income support programme must compensate the consumers accordingly. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a theoretical study where the model of a representative consumer under different specification of preferences is used to compare programme costs under price stabilization and income support programmes. Findings What the authors show in the paper that the comparative cost of the programmes crucially depends on the nature of preferences, as well as the good under question. For certain specifications of the indirect utility function and the marginal utility of money, one programme may cost less than the other. Any policymaker must take account of such nuances before making a blanket prescription. Research limitations/implications The main limitation is that only a representative consumer is taken. Practical implications The specification of indirect utility function plays a decisive role in deciding, which one these two policies, DBT or stabilizing price at a fixed level. Originality/value The main novelty of the paper is in the different specifications of the indirect utility function considered in the paper.