Price of Fairness on Networked Auctions

Abstract

We consider an auction design problem under network flow constraints. We focus on pricing mechanisms that provide fair solutions, where fairness is defined in absolute and relative terms. The absolute fairness is equivalent to “no individual losses” assumption. The relative fairness can be verbalized as follows: no agent can be treated worse than any other in similar circumstances. Ensuring the fairness conditions makes only part of the social welfare available in the auction to be distributed on pure market rules. The rest of welfare must be distributed without market rules and constitutes the so-calledprice of fairness. We prove that there exists the minimum ofprice of fairnessand that it is achieved when uniform unconstrained market price is used as the base price. Theprice of fairnesstakes into account costs of forced offers and compensations for lost profits. The final payments can be different than locational marginal pricing. That means that the widely applied locational marginal pricing mechanism does not in general minimize theprice of fairness.