Abstract
We model a market where identical buyers direct their search to identical capacity-constrained sellers. Sellers cannot fully commit to the list price so strategic bargaining may determine the sale price. We study search and pricing behavior in symmetric equilibrium. Sale prices exhibit equilibrium dispersion as they respond naturally to local demand conditions. Uncoordinated search decisions lead to equilibrium demand heterogeneity, so sellers realizing large demand bargain prices up. We characterize the sale price distribution parametrically, studying how different commitment limitations and market features affect pricing and surplus shares. We also determine endogenously
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