Abstract
The U.S. vaccine market exhibits a pricing structure in which the major purchaser of vaccines, the public sector, receives substantial discounts. This outcome is consistent with three theories of market behavior: third-degree price discrimination; bargaining power; and cost differences. The true nature of this pricing structure has important efficiency and policy implications. This paper uses a longitudinal data set of private catalog and federal contract prices to empirically determine whether price discrimination or bargaining power is being practiced in this market. I find that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, the results favor the bargaining power hypothesis.
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