Presuppositions of Religious Dialogue

Abstract

I would like to explain the point of view from which this paper is written. And this in itself will be a difficult task. In a religious dialogue we could be concerned in some way with questions which arise as a result of serious differences in doctrines between adherents of different religions or religious faiths. The ensuing debate or dialogue could take the form of an argument conducted from points of view that are distinctly partisan. If two doctrines are or are taken to be in head-on collision with each other by those who accept these doctrines, the holder of one doctrine would argue with the holder of the other doctrine with the object of showing that he is partly or wholly in error. If two statements both claiming to have truth-value are, or are taken to be, inconsistent with each other, then it is clear that one or both of them are or must be taken to be partly or wholly false. To attempt to show by marshalling reasons that the proposition inconsistent with that which one holds is wholly or partly false is what I mean by the partisan approach. The approach in a dialogue is partisan even if truth is claimed and the opposing ‘error’ exposed by reference to authority; for so long as there is to be a dialogue the setting up of a particular authority or of an authority specified in a particular way has to be justified by reasoning or at least a show of reasoning. If reasoning flows from and terminates in an authority without flowing beyond it and around it, so to speak, the fact that that ‘authority’ is not accepted by the other party is sufficient to bring the dialogue to an immediate end, leaving room only for a futile talking at cross purposes.