Presumptive Reasons and Stare Decisis

Abstract

Abstract Our practical reasoning often relies on defeasible generalizations; reasons for action that normally apply may have exceptions, they may not apply in this case, or even if they do, they may be defeated by conflicting reasons. Generally, however, people should not be expected to explain why a reason for action that would normally apply to them is defeated in a particular instance. My purpose in this chapter is to explicate one type of case in which an expectation to explain one’s failure to comply with a reason for action is justified, and demonstrate its bearing on the practical reasoning that underlies the legal doctrine of stare decisis in horizontal (non-binding) precedents in common law. I call them presumptive reasons. A presumptive reason is in place when an expectation is initially warranted that the subject either comply with a reason for action that would generally apply, or else explain why not. The first section shows that this burden of explanation is ubiquitous in our practical reasoning, and explains the rationale of it. The second section employs the idea of presumptive reasons to explain the structure of practical reasoning in horizontal, that is, non-binding precedents, showing that even where there is no legal obligation to follow a precedent, there is a legal obligation to explain why the reasons for following it are defeated in this case.