Pressure, Persuasion, Decision: Factors in the Partition of the Punjab, August 1947

Abstract

A sense of grievance over a “lost territory” may come to dominate the internal and external politics of a country. France's mourning over Alsace-Lorraine from 1870 to 1918, West German sensitiveness over the Oder-Neisser line in the 1950s and 60s, the Arab obsession with Israel—all are examples of states and peoples who will not forget the lands that have been torn from them. Pakistan is unique as a country with a sense of bitterness and grievance for territories that have never formed part of its polity. The concern with Kashmir needs no discussion here; it is not difficult to understand why Pakistanis believe they have been wronged. But this major, this massive, grievance leads to the perpetuation of a legend of injustice regarding the frontier line in the Punjab. Pakistanis believe that the Indian occupation of Kashmir was made possible by the allocation of Gurdaspur District to India, which afforded access to the state. Inasmuch as Gurdaspur appeared in the Second Schedule of the Indian Independence Act as part of the territories of the new West Punjab (Pakistan), being a district with a majority—even if a small majority—of Muslim inhabitants, there appears to be no good reason why it should have been given to India under the decision of Sir Cyril Radcliffe.