Pressure Groups and Rent Capture: How Effective Are Public Employment Policies: The Case of Gabon

Jean Louis Nkoulou Nkoulou

doi:10.5539/ijbm.v17n4p17

Abstract

In developing countries, and more specifically in the franc zone economies, the weight of the public sector seems to be preponderant, both in a situation where the State is a direct actor in the face of pressure groups and in a situation where it is an arbitrator between pressure groups.   From a theoretical model supported by an empirical verification, whose assumptions are based on the Gabonese economy, we wanted to know in what terms this problem arises in a rent economy in which the State has a strong hold on all economic and social levers.   The lessons learned from the model indicate that the explanation for this state hegemony lies in a deliberate weakening of the bargaining power of pressure group leaders through the lever of corruption. It turns out that the impact of such a choice of public policies is still harmful to unemployment, economic growth and poverty. Moreover, the game between the State and the unions in Gabon generates unstable economic balances as long as the structural reforms of the Gabonese economy remain embryonic in an increasingly open world. All of which worsens the state of poverty in this small country, which is nevertheless endowed with potential wealth.

Highlights

The recent questioning of the role of the State in the implementation of public policies (Baruch & Bezes, 2006; Maury, 2014), revealed by the evidence of diminishing returns to State interventions, on the one hand (Fauroux & Splitz, 2004), and by the asymmetries of information of which it is a victim on the other hand, combined with the harmful role played by pressure groups that from lobbying secret the capture of power and corruption in the public sector (Laffont & Tirole, 1991, Lavallee et al, 2010)
It seems appropriate to see in what terms this debate arises in Gabon for at least two obvious reasons: 1) The Gabonese economy is in the hands of the public sector, which is more than 50% state-owned and employs on average more than half of the employees of the Gabonese economy
Our results suggest that two non-exclusive reforms seem to be important in the Gabonese economy

Summary

Introduction

The recent questioning of the role of the State in the implementation of public policies (Baruch & Bezes, 2006; Maury, 2014), revealed by the evidence of diminishing returns to State interventions, on the one hand (Fauroux & Splitz, 2004), and by the asymmetries of information of which it is a victim on the other hand, combined with the harmful role played by pressure groups that from lobbying secret the capture of power and corruption in the public sector (Laffont & Tirole, 1991, Lavallee et al, 2010). The first presents the State, which embodies the public sector, and the pressure groups as institutions that constitute substitutes for the market, whose aim is to compensate for the lack of coordination of exchanges ijbm.ccsenet.org

Objectives

Findings

Discussion

Conclusion