Presidents, Political Regimes, and Contentious Supreme Court Nominations: A Historical Institutional Model

Abstract

Before the nominations of John Roberts and Samuel Alito, scholars consistently pointed to the presence of divided government as an underlying reason for conflict in the confirmation process for U.S. Supreme Court nominees. However, the importance of party unity and coalition-building appointments—each of which highlights the role of the president in the process—should not be underestimated in these confirmation battles. Moreover, an examination of the sixty twentieth-century nominations reveals that a presidency-focused political regimes model provides significant explanatory force for understanding when and what types of nominees are likely to face the most resistance in the Senate. It does so by incorporating Stephen Skowronek's analytical framework for understanding presidential authority to explain how and why different periods of political time affect presidential attempts to shape the U.S. Supreme Court through appointments. In turn, the model places recent conflict in the confirmation process in historical context.