Abstract

It has long been recognized that Presidents seek to influence Supreme Court policy by the appointment of ideologically "correct" Justices. Implicit here is the assumption that the Court response (if any) will be in the direction of the new appointee. The specific task of this paper is to challenge that assumption by showing what results, in group policy, can be expected from various kinds of changes in group membership. Before turning to this demonstration, however, some background must be set out. Toward this end, a model of Supreme Court decision making will be constructed.

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