Abstract
AbstractIn the 1970s, the Nixon and Carter administrations attempted to withdraw American forces from South Korea. A policy of troop reductions continued throughout the decade, and although some U.S. troops were withdrawn from South Korea, tens of thousands remained at the end of the 1970s. Although the policy goals were largely symmetrical, the rate of withdrawal differed sharply, with Richard M. Nixon pulling out nearly 10 times as many troops as Jimmy Carter. This article argues that bureaucratic actors, including senior military officers, were responsible for the divergent results of the Korean withdrawal programs.
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