Presidential Government

Abstract

This article analyzes presidentialism and semipresidentialism in the context of a comparative study of forms of democratic government. It highlights the consequences of a dual democratic legitimacy of presidents and congress, and enumerates the possible patterns of conflict and/or compromise. The election of presidents and congress for fixed time periods and their mutual independence generates a distinctive rigidity compared to parliamentary regimes. The essay summarizes the negative consequences, basically derived from the above-mentioned defining characteristics, particularly divided government. It also presents the arguments in favor of presidentialism. A number of less essential or variable characteristics are noted, like different forms of election and the implications for the party system and public policy, as well as for the relation to the bureaucracy and the military. A reference is made to the debate about the instability of presidential democracies. In a second section semipresidentialism is defined. The proliferation of such systems in recent times, in many cases dubiously democratic, and the need to distinguish the ‘formal’ and the ‘material’ constitution is noted. Formally semipresidential regimes actually function as parliamentary. Particular attention is given to the case of the Fifth French Republic, as the pragmatic case and to the pattern of ‘cohabitation’ when the president is elected by one party (or coalition) and the prime minister depends on the confidence of a parliament with a majority of a different party or parties. The success in France should not hide situations in which no prime minister enjoys parliamentary support, like at the end of the Weimar Republic in Germany where the president appointed cabinets that could not find support in the Reichstag, a pattern that led to the appointment of Hitler as chancellor.