Abstract

Why are some institutions capable of enhancing democracy, while others struggle under pressure? Shugart and Carey wrote their seminal book Presidents and Assemblies at a crucial time in modern history in an effort to answer these fundamental questions. Because of bold claims and huge theoretical and conceptual contributions, their timely publication became the starting point for a new way to think about institutional specifications and types of political systems. And although their examples are by now dated, the idea of “trade-off” or “balancing efficiency and representativeness” still speaks to the fundamental questions of regime change and democratic sustainability. While their study made clear that there are distinctions between system types, they also argued that not a specific type is more conducive or damaging to democracy; rather specific institutional configurations lead to a vulnerability of a political regime. Twenty-five years after the first publication of Presidents and Assemblies, this special issue uses this argument and reconnects Shugart and Carey’s book with the recent debate on individual attributes of legislative–executive relations and their effect on democracy. This article serves as an introduction and highlights the rationale and the major themes that run through the contributions to the special issue.

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