Abstract
Building on my previous writings on presentism, pluralism, and “complementary science”, I develop an activist view of historiography. I begin by recognizing the inevitability of presentism. Our own purposes and perspectives do and should guide the production of our accounts of the past; like funerals, history-writing is for the living. There are different kinds of presentist history, depending on the historians’ purposes and perspectives. My particular inclination is pluralist. Science remembers its own history from a particular perspective (“whiggism”), which views the past as imperfect versions of the present; if professional historians of science shared this perspective, our work would be redundant. Instead, we can make it our task to illuminate the aspects of the past of science that scientists themselves tend to ignore and forget. History of science can also take a more productive role in the creation and improvement of scientific knowledge. Scientific progress as we know it tends to involve the shutting down of alternative paths of inquiry, resulting in a loss of potential and actual knowledge. A critical and sympathetic engagement with the past allows us to recover the lost paths, which can also suggest new paths. These points will be illustrated by a number of examples, especially from the history of chemistry and physics, including the recovery and extension of past experiments.
Highlights
In this paper I seek to synthesize and develop my previously expressed views on three topics: presentism in history-writing, pluralism in science, and the “complementary” role of history and philosophy of science with respect to specialist science
Presentism in historiography is inevitable in a basic sense: the historian is quite stuck in the present, and it does not make sense to attempt to escape the present (Chang 2009, 252)
He thinks that historians of science are more sensitive to this issue than other historians: “In some ways, a militant hostility to Whiggish narratives defines the history of science against other fields, and one can often spot historians of science at a talk when they query the potentially Whiggish approach of a speaker in, say, military or legal or political history.” (Gordin 2014, 417; emphasis original) Gordin considers that “Anti-Whiggism seems mandatory today because we have wired it into the central core of our field as a discipline.” (Gordin 2014, 420, emphasis original)
Summary
In this paper I seek to synthesize and develop my previously expressed views on three topics: presentism in history-writing, pluralism in science, and the “complementary” role of history and philosophy of science with respect to specialist science. The synthetic position may be considered a particular type of activist historiography, which holds that by writing history we should attempt to achieve specific aims pertinent to other aspects of human life, going beyond a mere description of the past. My position is that presentism is inevitable in history-writing, but that there is a choice to be made in what kind of. H. Chang presentism we opt for; my preference is for a pluralist presentism, which seeks to recover and develop aspects of past science that tend to be ignored in scientists’ own views of the past. There are many elements going into this synthesis; some of them were developed in detail in previous publications, and will only be summarized very briefly; others were insufficiently developed before, and will receive more detailed attention here
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