Abstract
alongwitha succession of discrete thoughts that giverise to feeling of the past and future, areference to mechanisms outside the phe-nomenal realm is necessary (Revonsuo,2003). Thus, the question of what couldbe the neurophysiological mechanismsresponsiblefortheseexperiencesshouldbeaddressed.In this Opinion Article we shall buildourargumentbasedonthebiologicalreal-ism approach to consciousness proposedby Revonsuo (2006). According to thisapproach,subjectiveconsciousnessisarealphenomenon that is tightly anchored to abiological reality within the human brain.Broadly speaking, the human brain is thespecificphysical“location,”wherethesub-jective mental reality and the objectiveneurobiological reality are intimately con-nected along a unified metastable contin-uum (Fingelkurts et al., 2009, 2013).Wehavearguedpreviously(Fingelkurtset al., 2010) that phenomenal conscious-nessreferstoahigherleveloforganizationin the brain and captures all
Highlights
It is the every person’s daily phenomenal experience that conscious states represent their contents as occurring
We have argued previously (Fingelkurts et al, 2010) that phenomenal consciousness refers to a higher level of organization in the brain and captures all immediate and undeniable phenomena of subjective experiences that present to any person and right here
In line with this conceptualization, simple cognitive operations that present some partial aspect of the whole object/scene/concept are presented in the brain by local 3D-fields produced by discrete and transient neuronal assemblies, which can be recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG) (Figures 1A,B)
Summary
It is the every person’s daily phenomenal experience that conscious states represent their contents as occurring now. Understanding of the operation as a process and considering its combinatorial nature, seems especially well suited for describing and studying the mechanisms of how information about the objective physical entities of the external world can be integrated within the present moment in the internal subjective domain by means of entities of distributed neuronal assemblies (Fingelkurts et al, 2010, 2013).
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