Prescription in English fire regulation: treatment, cure or placebo?

Angus Law,Neal Butterworth

doi:10.1680/jfoen.19.00004

Abstract

This paper presents a discussion of the recent ‘ban’ on combustible cladding that has been implemented in England following the Grenfell Tower fire. The ban is discussed in terms of its context within the existing regulatory system in England and is analysed in terms of the intended and unintended consequences. Key intended consequences are identified as the prohibition of ‘Grenfell-type’ cladding, the banning of desktop studies for relevant buildings and the banning of some forms of engineered timber construction. Unintended consequences include the devaluation of private leaseholder’s homes, the potential for the problems with the construction industry to be perceived as ‘fixed’ and a raft of somewhat absurd administrative effects. The authors conclude that the ban has likely been effective in its overall aim but that its success is, ironically, inherently bound up with the efficacy of the very regulations that it was intended to fix. The authors also identify that the new ban is potentially susceptible to ‘gaming’ by unscrupulous parties within the construction industry.

Highlights

On 17 May 2018, Dame Judith Hackitt released her final report on the state of the UK’s construction industry
This paper examines the immediate consequences of the ban and identifies how unintended consequences may manifest – and how these may be mitigated
A key question in relation to many existing buildings is, ‘Was Regulation 7(2) introduced because the government believed that the level of safety in Approved Document B (ADB) was too low, or was Regulation 7(2) introduced because the government had lost faith in the industry’s ability to follow the guidance in ADB?’. This is a question of paramount importance for the owners of flats in many affected buildings, as the authors have experience of building control authorities, fire services, insurers and mortgage providers who have expressed the view that the new Regulation 7(2) (in addition to guidance in relation to Category 2 aluminium composite material (ACM) in MHCLG Advice Note 11 (MHCLG, 2018c)) is an indication that buildings that previously complied with ADB are no longer considered by government to be adequately safe

Summary

Introduction

On 17 May 2018, Dame Judith Hackitt released her final report on the state of the UK’s construction industry. As the day wore on, Dame Hackitt again presented her report This time to Parliament’s Select Committee on Housing, Communities and Local Government. On BBC One’s programme Question Time (BBC, 2018b), Dominic Raab, the Minister of State for Housing and Planning, came under pressure from Diane Abbot MP not to consult, but to issue a directive to ban combustible cladding immediately. He responded by highlighting the complexity of the issue – asking Diane Abbot, ‘can you define. This paper examines the immediate consequences of the ban and identifies how unintended consequences may manifest – and how these may be mitigated

The functional requirement

The ban

Intended consequences

Unintended consequences?

Conclusion