Abstract

This article examines France's efforts to prepare for war during the interwar period. Immediately following the First World War, French political and military leaders, convinced of the possibility (and indeed the likelihood) of another European war, set about preparing the country for a conflict that was expected to be total in nature. Given the importance that French planners attached to economic factors in such a conflict, the article focuses on industrial and economic preparations for war during peacetime. Industrial preparations involved placing French industry in a position to produce large quantities of armaments as quickly as possible once war began, while economic preparations consisted of organizing the non-military sectors of the economy to meet wartime civilian needs. The article argues that France's economic and industrial preparations for war fell far short of what was needed — an assessment that reflects the huge gap between the plans drawn up in the wake of the First World War and the results achieved on the eve of the Second World War. Much of this failure, moreover, can be attributed to the weaknesses of the Conseil supérieur de la défense nationale, the institution charged with preparing the country for a future war. In addition to highlighting the concrete aspects of industrial and economic preparations for war, a focus on institutions not only throws light on how the interwar French state worked in practice, but also directs attention to a critical factor in the success of any regime: its ability to translate policy goals into concrete measures.

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