Preparing Education Doctoral Students for Epistemological Diversity

Abstract

One of the most confusing developments in educational research over the past quarter-century has been the proliferation of epistemologies-beliefs about what counts as knowledge in the field of education, what is evidence of a claim, and what counts as a warrant for that evidence. Although the discussion of various epistemological perspectives in educational research often is highly abstract, and viewed as the prerogative of philosophers at some distance from the real world of educational research practice, the consequences of this diversity are quite real. Beliefs about what counts as knowledge are a central determinant about what a field knows about its subject matter. The variability in such beliefs can lead to small and large gaps in what various members of the educational research community hold to be true about educational phenomena. These discontinuities are partly at the root of the widespread perception that the community of educational researchers has failed to amass a cumulative body of knowledge about how schools and schooling work (National Research Council, 1999; Ravitch, 1998; Viadero, 1999). Few claims about educational research are as damning, or as damaging to the enterprise. Experienced researchers and novices alike find it hard to keep up with the cacophony of diverse epistemologies. Behind the welter of names-positivism, naturalism, postpositivism, empiricism, relativism, feminist standpoint epistemology, foundationalism, postmodernism, each with an array of subspecies-lie important questions: Is there a single, absolute truth about educational phenomena, or are there multiple truths? (Or is the concept of truth itself so problematic as to be of no value in understanding the world?) Can we count on our senses, or on reason, to distinguish that which is true about the world from that which is false? Are there methods that can lead us close to understanding, or are there inherent indeterminacies in all methods? Is knowledge of the world discovered, or constructed? Can knowledge of the world be evaluated independent of the social and historical contexts in which it exists, or is it always contingent upon, or relative to, particular circumstances?