Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of ‘premature consent’. The term ‘premature consent’ (introduced in a 2018 paper by J.K. Davis) denotes patient decisions that are: (i) formulated prior to discussion with the appropriate healthcare professional (HCP); (ii) based on information from unreliable sources (e.g. parts of the internet); and (iii) resolutely maintained despite the HCP having provided alternative reliable information. HCPs are not obliged to respect premature consent patients’ demands for unindicated treatments. But why? What is it that premature consent patients do or get wrong? Davis has argued that premature consent patients are incompetent and misinformed. We argue that this view is not sustainable. A more plausible position asserts that premature consent threatens the integrity of the medical profession. We argue that this gives rise to a negative patient duty (to not obstruct HCPs in upholding the integrity of the medical profession) which premature consent patients fail to honour. We argue for a further positive duty of good faith engagement in shared decision-making. This implies willingness to potentially revise or justify one’s evaluative bases (core assumptions, beliefs, values, etc.). Fundamentally, the problem with premature consent patients is that certain of their evaluative bases are not open to revision. They therefore fail in their duty to participate faithfully in the shared decision-making process.

Highlights

  • Informed consent requires that patients and research participants are adequately informed about proposed interventions

  • A more compelling position holds premature consent wrong insofar as it undermines the integrity of the medical profession (Brazier 2006). In clarifying this position we argue that premature consent jeopardises the societal benefits secured by medical integrity, but violates a negative patient duty to not obstruct healthcare professional (HCP) in upholding the integrity of the medical profession

  • In the section titled “Patient duties” we argue that premature consent patients fail in a positive duty of good faith engagement in a process of shared decision-making

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Summary

Introduction

Informed consent requires that patients and research participants are adequately informed about proposed interventions. In the section titled “Health information seeking, competence, and understanding” we argue against Davis’s (2018) contention that premature consent patients’ decisions do not (fully) command respect because such patients are incompetent and misinformed. Privacy-aware users have sought to avoid filter bubbles, profiling, micro-targeting, and tracking by using privacy-friendly search engines This may provoke other issues: findings from Ghezzi et al (2019) suggest that privacy-focused search engines may return results of lower health information quality. These difficulties affect everyone to some extent. There is no reason to suppose premature consent patients disproportionately subject to them

Are premature consent patients incompetent?
Are premature consent patients adequately informed?
Autonomy and the integrity of the medical profession
Captive helpers
The integrity of the medical profession
Patient duties
Conclusion
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