Prelude to Weltblitzkrieg: Germany's Naval Policy toward the United States of America, 1939-41

Abstract

will either become a world power or will cease to exist.' This declaration, italicized in Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf, not idle phraseology. It formed the basis of Germany's foreign policy from 1933 until 1945. The realization of Germany's status as a world power remained for Hitler his life's mission. Nothing better demonstrates this point of view than his Nero order of March 19, 1945, his hastily composed Political Testament on the last day of his life, or those words uttered in the winter of 1941-42: am also cold as ice in this: If the German people are not willing to take an active part in their self-preservation, good: then they shall cease to exist.2 Hitler's final judgment of the German people already contained in these words. Germany had failed to establish its hegemony over continental Europe; it had failed its historic mission to become a truly world power; and therefore it had shown itself unworthy of the even greater tasks set down by the fuhrer. And these had aimed at nothing less than world dominion (Weltherrschaft). This seemingly obvious fact is nowadays all too often obscured, especially in works investigating the origins of the Second World War.3 What follows is an attempt to shed some light both on Hitler's ultimate foreign policy aims and on his responsibility for starting not only what he hoped would be a localized German-Polish war, but also for a world war in 1941. An examination of his attitude toward the United States, as seen through his discussions with German naval leaders,4 helps to :This project supported through the Klaus Epstein Memorial Scholarship of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. IHitler, Mein Kampf (Munich, 1933), p. 741. 2Cited in A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik and Kriegfiuhrung 1940-1941 (Frankfurt, 1965). p. 556. 3See esp. A. J. P. Taylor. The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961); D. L. Hoggan, Der Erzwungene Krieg (Tiubingen. 1961); and F. Ruge. Der Seekrieg 19391945 (Stuttgart, 1956). p. 180, who maintains that a German attack against the United States was never planned and in view of the strength of the American navy also an impossibility. 4The main documents are deposited at the Bundesarchiv-Militairchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau, West Germany: PG 32184 Case GE 239. I SKL. Teil C VIl, Uberlegungen des Chefs der SKL und Niederschriften uber Vortrage und Besprechungen beim Fiihrer, September 1939Dezember 1940 (hereafter PG 32184 Case GE 239. I SKL. Teil C VII); PG 32185 Case GE 240, ibid., Januar 1941-Dezember 1941; and PG 31748 Case GE 277. 1 SKL. Teil Ca, Grundlegende Fragen der Kriegfiihurug, Mai 1939-November 1943 (herafter PG 31748 Case GE 277. I SKL. Teil Ca).