Abstract
The molten salt reactor designs, where fissile and fertile materials are dissolved in molten salts, under consideration in the framework of the Generation IV International Forum, present some unusual characteristics in terms of design, operation, safety and also proliferation resistance issues. This paper has the main objective of presenting some proliferation challenges for the reference version of the Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR), a large power reactor based on the thorium fuel cycle. Preliminary studies of proliferation resistance are presented here, dedicated to the threat of nuclear material diversion in the MSFR, considering both the reactor system itself and the processing units located onsite.
Highlights
The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) [1] has proposed a methodology that should allow the analysis of proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR&PP) issues in advanced nuclear reactors under development
Because the Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR) is in the design phase, we have adopted a gradual approach of the issues, focusing on the seemingly most critical situations
By applying the GIF methodology to this case, we successively identify the elements of the nuclear power plant (NPP) site, we identify the targets for material diversion and the pathways to achieve diversion, and we suggest countermeasures to prevent this
Summary
The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) [1] has proposed a methodology that should allow the analysis of proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR&PP) issues in advanced nuclear reactors under development. The first PR case studied for the MSFR and presented here focuses on the threat of a concealed diversion of material by a host state having unlimited means, followed by processing of this material in an undeclared facility It is limited, as a first step, at documenting the system response as designers. By applying the GIF methodology to this case, we successively identify the elements of the nuclear power plant (NPP) site, we identify the targets for material diversion and the pathways to achieve diversion, and we suggest countermeasures to prevent this. This corresponds to the designer’s work and do not contain risks evaluation. Consequences are presented for the design of the onsite chemical processing unit related to proliferation resistance issues
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