Abstract
AbstractAlthough research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker's (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker's words from constituting evidence for the hearer's belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief.
Highlights
Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s seminal Epistemic Injustice (2007), a whole field of study has flourished that focuses on how prejudice impacts credibility judgments in epistemic exchanges and harms human beings in their capacity to know and contribute to knowledge.One aspect that this literature highlights is that in the presence of a prejudice, the relationship between evidence, belief, and justification is peculiar
In the case of testimony, in particular, when a prejudice is in place against a marginalized social group, a person belonging to that group is typically considered not credible, or not as credible as she should be
My central claim is that prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and what cannot count as evidence
Summary
Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s seminal Epistemic Injustice (2007), a whole field of study has flourished that focuses on how prejudice impacts credibility judgments in epistemic exchanges and harms human beings in their capacity to know and contribute to knowledge One aspect that this literature highlights is that in the presence of a prejudice, the relationship between evidence, belief, and justification is peculiar. I am not seeking a causal explanation of the mechanisms of prejudice but a conceptual clarification of its normative role in the structure of justification.1 By examining this issue, it is possible to shed light on two related and more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice and argue that this account clarifies the following three aspects described above: the role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification, the resistance of prejudice to counterevidence, and the different steps involved in overcoming prejudice.
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