Abstract
The preference for morality in others is regarded as a dominant factor in person perception. Moral traits are thought to foster liking, and immoral traits are thought to foster disliking, irrespective of the context in which they are embedded. We report the results of four studies that oppose this view. Using both explicit and implicit measures, we found that the preference for morality vs. immorality in others is conditional on the evaluator's current goals. Specifically, when immorality was conducive to participants' current goals, the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others was eliminated or reversed. The preferences for mercifulness vs. mercilessness (experiment 1), honesty vs. dishonesty (experiment 2), sexual fidelity vs. infidelity (experiment 3), and altruism vs. selfishness (experiment 4) were all found to be conditional. These findings oppose the consensus view that people have a dominant preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others. Our findings also speak to nativist and empiricist theories of social preferences and the stability of the "social contract" underlying productive human societies.
Highlights
The preference for morality in others is regarded as a dominant factor in person perception
If the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is conditional on the demands of our current goals, this preference should emerge only when the moral trait is more goal-conducive than the immoral trait
If the preference for moral vs. immoral traits in others is conditional on the demands of our current goals, only defense attorneys should like the merciful juror more than the merciless juror, and this preference should be eliminated or reversed among prosecuting attorneys
Summary
The distinction between conditional and dominant factors in person perception dates back to Asch [11]. PNAS PLUS valence of morality traits is not conditional on the surrounding context, people ought to prefer morality vs immorality in others irrespective of their current motivational state. The consensus view is that morality traits are dominant factors in person perception; that is, moral traits foster liking, and immoral traits foster disliking, irrespective of context This claim assumes that the valence of morality traits in others is not conditional on the demands of our currently active goals. Participants ought to rate the target they perceive to be more moral as the more desirable close friend, regardless of their current feelings toward the targets in the context of the criminal trial [32].] In each experiment, we had participants rate the targets’ competence (see Supporting Information, Sections 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1 for further details) and confirmed that effects on liking could not be attributed to variation in perceived competence. Both attorneys perceived mercifulness as positively related to moral character, but only defense attorneys perceived mercifulness as positively related to goal-conduciveness
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
