Abstract

The standard decision-theoretic model separates information and preferences. We argue that some behavioral phenomena in information processing (e.g., polarization) are closely related to this separation.We propose a model in which agents receive vague information, which they refine when they are required to make probabilistic judgments, or to take an action. By doing so, they also refine their beliefs about some traits or states (e.g., their information-processing ability), which affects their utility.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.