Abstract
Preference reversal is often explained as an information-processing effect, whereby individuals respond differently to valuation problems than to straight choices. Regret theory offers the alternative explanation that individuals act on consistent, but nontransitive, preferences. Regret theory, in its most general form, is shown to make specific predictions about nontransitive pairwise choices that correspond with the preferences reversal phenomenon. Some experiments designed to discriminate between these two explanations are reported. The main finding is that, as regret theory predicts, the preference reversal phenomenon can be reproduced in situations in which subjects confront only choice problems. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
