Preemptive War

Abstract

Abstract “All successful wars of mankind, gentlemen, have been preventive wars.” Adolf Hitler, December 12, 1944 (Vagts 1956: 267) Preemptive war and preventive war have long been considered two completely separate phenomena, but the US Administration of George W. Bush and Richard B. Cheney (2001–2008) chose to call preventive war “preemption” (United States, White House 2002). Consequently, what is frequently referred to today by both supporters and opponents as “preemptive war” is actually preventive war. In 2002 “preemptive attack” was officially defined by the US military as “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent” (United States, Department of Defense 2002: 33). “Preventive war” was defined as “a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk” (United States, Department of Defense 2002: 336). Thus, according to the US military, preemption responds to a threat that is imminent, and preventive war responds to a threat that is not imminent. The distinction is clear and is generally accepted outside recent US political circles. Since the purpose of the strategic doctrine announced by the Bush/ Cheney Administration was to eliminate threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before they become imminent on the ground that the risk of waiting is too great (United States, White House 2002: 23), it is more accurately characterized as a mislabeled doctrine of preventive war proposed as restricted to threats with WMD (Shue and Rodin 2007: 1–12).