Abstract

Predictive processing accounts of perception (PP) assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism might be reconciled with PP from both an internalist and externalist perspective, and argue that an externalist foundationalism provides the best match with PP.

Highlights

  • In epistemological theories about perceptual justification, several versions of foundationalism have become increasingly popular

  • I have explored several ways in which one is able to maintain a foundationalist account of perception in the face of the challenge from predictive processing

  • On a strong internalist foundationalist account, one should ignore subpersonal processes, and focus only on the content and phenomenology of experience to determine whether a belief is epistemically basic and prima facie justified

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Summary

Introduction

In epistemological theories about perceptual justification, several versions of foundationalism have become increasingly popular. It is always possible to question whether what one perceives is the case, just as it is possible to question the reasons one could give for believing that what one perceives is the case, but the fact that one can always ask for more reasons does not show that these reasons are really doing any work in the original justification of the perceptual belief When it comes to perception, the foundationalist view appears to give the most plausible answer to the regress problem: it accommodates the inherent epistemic force that comes from perception, and is in line with what we require from agents who have justified perceptual beliefs. The section will attempt to put pressure on this foundationalist view by exploring a challenge that arises from the idea that perception is crucially connected to top-down prediction

The challenge from predictive processing
Strong internalist foundationalism
Weak internalist foundationalism
Inferentialist strong reliabilism
Inferentialist weak reliabilism
Findings
Conclusion
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