Abstract
Predictive processing framework (PP) has found wide applications in cognitive science and philosophy. It is an attractive candidate for a unified account of the mind in which perception, action, and cognition fit together in a single model. However, PP cannot claim this role if it fails to accommodate an essential part of cognition—conceptual thought. Recently, Williams (Synthese 1–27, 2018) argued that PP struggles to address at least two of thought’s core properties—generality and rich compositionality. In this paper, I show that neither necessarily presents a problem for PP. In particular, I argue that because we do not have access to cognitive processes but only to their conscious manifestations, compositionality may be a manifest property of thought, rather than a feature of the thinking process, and result from the interplay of thinking and language. Pace Williams, both of these capacities, constituting parts of a complex and multifarious cognitive system, may be fully based on the architectural principles of PP. Under the assumption that language presents a subsystem separate from conceptual thought, I sketch out one possible way for PP to accommodate both generality and rich compositionality.
Highlights
The predictive processing framework1 successfully accounts for a wide variety of B Sofiia Rappe0123456789().: V,volSynthese (2022) 200:0 perceptual and cognitive processes in multiple domains
Vision (Hohwy et al, 2008), body-awareness (Palmer et al, 2015), language and communication (Friston & Frith, 2015; Rappe, 2019), emotion (Miller & Clark, 2018; Seth, 2013; Velasco & Loev, 2020), and psychiatric disorders2 have all received explanations that appeal to the basic Predictive processing framework (PP) architectural principles such as hierarchical generative models, long term prediction error minimization, and precision weightings
There are other reasons to object to the unifying power of PP, but conceptual thought presents one of the biggest challenges: If it cannot be explained as a predictive process, PP cannot pretend to provide an exhaustive account of the mind (Seth, 2015), certainly not for philosophers
Summary
The predictive processing framework (or PP for short, see Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999) successfully accounts for a wide variety of
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
