Predictive Memory and the Surprising Gap

Felipe De Brigard

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420

Abstract

Predictive Memory and the Surprising Gap

Highlights

I suggest that this conspicuous absence might be partially remedied, at least for the case of remembering, by looking at recent Bayesian accounts of memory retrieval developed after Anderson’s Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACTR) model (Anderson and Milson, 1989; Anderson, 1990; Anderson and Schooler, 1991, 2000)
I suggest that the ACT-R model can be read as describing how memory retrieval attempts to minimize prediction error when finding the optimal memory given the costs of its retrieval and the organism’s current needs
The ACT-R model captures this insight in Bayesian terms : let Hi be the hypothesis that a particular memory is needed during a particular context, and let E be the evidence for an element of said context

Summary

Introduction

I suggest that this conspicuous absence might be partially remedied, at least for the case of remembering, by looking at recent Bayesian accounts of memory retrieval developed after Anderson’s Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACTR) model (Anderson and Milson, 1989; Anderson, 1990; Anderson and Schooler, 1991, 2000). Where P(E|Hi) determines the likelihood ratio that E is the case given Hi (i.e., the context factor), and P(Hi) gives the prior probability that a particular memory will be needed (i.e., the history factor).

Results

Conclusion