Abstract
The experimental research paradigm lies at the core of empirical psychology. New data analytical and computational tools continually enrich its methodological arsenal, while the paradigm’s mission remains the testing of theoretical predictions and causal explanations. Predictions regarding experimental results necessarily point to the future. Once the data are collected, the causal inferences refer to a hypothesis now lying in the past. The experimental paradigm is not designed to permit strong inferences about particular incidents that occurred before predictions were made. In contrast, historical research and scholarship in other humanities focus on this backward direction of inference. The disconnect between forward-looking experimental psychology and backward-looking historical (i.e., narrative) psychology is a challenge in the postmodern era, which can be addressed. To illustrate this possibility, I discuss three historical case studies in light of theory and research in contemporary psychology.
Highlights
The experimental research paradigm lies at the core of empirical psychology
The research topic presented by Frontiers in Psychology, to which this article seeks to make a contribution, asks about “modern” and “postmodern” approaches, and how their differences might be overcome
Taking the terms “modern” and “postmodern” as they are commonly understood, the prospect of a full reconciliation seems remote (Bereiter, 1994). Postmodernism, as it emerged from French théorie sees itself as a revolution, with its raison d’être being the rejection of modernism (Pluckrose and Lindsay, 2020)
Summary
“Wo der Brotgelehrte trennt, vereinigt der philosophische Geist.” [Where the ordinary scholar divides, the philosophical spirit unites.] – Friedrich Schiller, May 26, 1789, in his first lecture as chair of history at the University of Jena. A one-to-one association between experimental results, which yield p(E|C), and what the explainer wants, which is p(C|E), is limited to the special case in which the cause is as probable as the effect a priori, that is, if p(C) = p(E). A behavioral economics perspective notes the similarity between the final outcome of “Crusoe 4: Friday 3” and the typical result of an ultimatum game (Güth, 1995) Crusoe claims his first preference and asks Friday to settle for something short of his, Friday’s, maximum. Supposing that one fiction cannot disprove another, I settle for showing that psychological science can help explain behavior in rational terms.
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