Abstract
The structure of interest group representation serves as an efficient explanation for the varied results of common property management, specifically commercial fisheries. Two characteristics of interest group structure are considered. First, when one united lobby represents fishermen, the industry controls the policy agenda and resists providing information required for efficient regulation. In contrast, industries made up of rival sectors offer competing policy proposals with supporting biological, economic and legal information. Second, groups suffering from collective action problems cannot successfully appeal to elected officials to overturn decisions by the agency managing resources. The two variables of coalition structure and the strength of groups within alliances combine into a fourfold typology that suggests the behavior of groups, elected officials and bureaus in the fishery management as well as their ability to prevent stock decline. This article develops the model and illustrates it using four cases from United States demersal fisheries.
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