Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem

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Previous articleNext article No AccessPrecontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution ProblemRichard CraswellRichard Craswell Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 17, Number 2Jun., 1988 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/468135 Views: 11Total views on this site Citations: 29Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1988 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Albert H. Choi and George Triantis Contract Design When Relationship-Specific Investment Produces Asymmetric Information, The Journal of Legal Studies 50, no.22 (Nov 2021): 219–260.https://doi.org/10.1086/716173Johan N. M. 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