Precis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility

Abstract

The leading idea of our theory of moral responsibility is that responsibility is associated with control. But we contend that there are two distinct kinds of control. Regulative control involves alternative possibilities: it is a kind of dual power of free action. In contrast, guidance control does not, by its nature, involve alternative possibilities. Whereas typically it might be thought that regulative and guidance control go together, the Frankfurt-type cases show that they are separate and distinct sorts of control. And, whereas typically it is thought that moral responsibility requires regulative control, we claim that moral responsibility-for actions, omissions, and consequences-simply requires guidance control.' Thus, although we do not believe that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities, we preserve the traditional association of moral responsibility with control. But what, exactly, does guidance control consist in? On our view, guidance control should be understood in terms of two elements: the agent's ownership of the mechanism that actually issues in the relevant behavior, and the reasons-responsiveness of that mechanism. So, for example, an agent is morally responsible for an action, on our account, to the extent that this action issues from the agent's own, reasons-responsive mechanism. We contend that individuals make certain kinds of mechanisms their own by taking responsibility for them. (When we speak of taking responsibility for a kind of mechanism, we understand this as shorthand for taking responsibility for behavior that issues from that kind of mechanism.) It is useful to distinguish two kinds of context in which an agent might take responsibility for the kind of mechanism that leads to his behavior. The typical case is one