Pre- versus post-crisis central banking in Qatar

Abstract

In the years before the global financial crisis of 2008–2010, Qatar experienced a huge build-up of liquidity surplus in the banking system, mainly driven by surging net capital inflows. This paper identifies various sources of interbank liquidity in Qatar and discusses the various implications of structural primary liquidity surplus for the money market in particular and the economy at large. The paper attempts to evaluate the Qatar Central Bank policy making and conduct during the pre- and post-crisis periods within a framework of the Austrian monetary overinvestment theories, and concludes that the central bank had forcibly committed several forced monetary policy mistakes, which resulted in a breakdown in the interest rate channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. This led to the inability of the central bank to control the interbank interest rate and to an accelerating inflation rate during the pre-crisis years. In contrast, a dramatic change in the central bank's monetary policy framework and a deliberate monetary policy mistake on behalf of the central bank resulted in a restoration of the interest rate channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, stabilization of the interbank interest rate close to the central bank's policy rate and a sharp deceleration in the inflation rate in the post-crisis period. The paper concludes by offering brief policy recommendations.