Abstract

The previous Westminster criminal justice system entailed a different kind of separation of powers insofar as it concerns the role of state prosecutors. In the Westminster system prosecutors are part of the executive branch, whereas they were a split-off from the judiciary in constitutional states and function like a de facto second organ of the third branch of state power. Currently executive interference in state prosecutions often leads to pre-trial inequality. A further difficulty arises from the unconsidered manner in which the former royal prerogative of pardoning was retained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It used to be a royal veto of judicial sentences in the constitutional monarchy of the former Westminster model. Although the corresponding veto of parliamentary legislation by the head of state did not survive into modern times, the pardoning power has not been discontinued. Section 84(2)(j) thus causes an irreconcilable conflict with section 165(5) of the Constitution which guarantees the legally binding force of judicial decisions. It undermines the rule of law and leads to post-trial inequality in the execution of sentences. The parole system, which dates back to 1959, likewise allows the executive to overrule judicial sentences and is in conflict with section 165(5). The perpetuation of the status quo in criminal justice is in effect leading to a re-Westminstering of the constitutional state.

Highlights

  • L Wolf*South Africa adopted the constitutional state model by implementing the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution) and subsequently the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution)

  • Constitutional powers of the prosecuting authority in relation to judicial powers and whether or not the entering of a nolle prosequi in a prima facie case unconstitutionally blocks access to the courts. He did not elaborate on the presidential indemnity argument, but instead argued that the Democratic Alliance does not have locus standi to contest the dropping of corruption charges against Jacob Zuma, who was Deputy President when the first nolle prosequi was entered and the African National Congress (ANC)'s presidential candidate when the second nolle prosequi was entered

  • Since the constitutionality of parliamentary legislation which prescribes excessive sentences can be contested in the courts on the basis that all state action must be in proportion to the object pursued,[320] it is not clear why the rule of law should be sacrificed by allowing an executive president to overrule binding judicial sentences based on valid law and legal considerations of justice

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Summary

Introduction

South Africa adopted the constitutional state model by implementing the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution) and subsequently the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution). Director as foreseen by section 179(1)(a) and ministerial oversight under section 179(6) have led to the presumption that the prosecutors resort under the executive branch and perform administrative powers, whereas they are responsible for criminal justice Another problem relates to the prosecutors' powers to take nolle prosequi decisions in cases that would merit prosecution. This may impinge upon judicial powers, since such a decision is tantamount to a non-judicial acquittal Insofar as it concerns post-trial equal treatment with regard to the remission of sentence, the main source of difficulties is section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution. It will be asked if constitutional provisions that were certified by the Constitutional Court can be struck down on an ex post facto basis because they perpetuate the Westminster criminal justice system and undermine the constitutional state

Pre-trial equal treatment and the demarcation of prosecuting powers
Selective prosecution: a case study of Shaik and Zuma
Prosecuting powers in relation to judicial powers
Prosecuting powers in relation to executive state administration
The origins of the Westminster prosecuting model
The origins of the Continental European prosecuting model
The prosecuting authority as a state organ in its own right
The prosecuting model in Germany
The difficulties of transcending to a constitutional state
The flawed nature of the doctrine of functional independence
Executive appointment of prosecutors
Arbitrary nolle prosequis in service of the executive
Prosecution-led criminal investigations
Delineation of prosecuting and policing powers
Summarising difficulties relating to prosecuting powers
Controversy about the medical parole decision
Three strategies to attain a release from prison
Contributory evidence
Executive footwork
Timely statutory amendments
Judicial review of parole and pardons
Legality of parole decisions
Parole: an executive power?
Constitutional review of parole and pardons
Certification of presidential pardons and legal precedent
Uncritical retention of royal pardons in a republican state
Substantive justice as a prerequisite for equality in sentence execution
The unsatisfactory double-barrel approach in Germany
Historical background
Judicial review of sentences
Pardoning procedures
Tentative thawing of the impasse
Marginalisation of the judiciary
Parole boards in practice
Conclusions
Full Text
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