Précis of Morality: Its Nature and Justification*

Abstract

In this book I provide descriptions of the concepts of morality, rationality and impartiality, and show how they are related to each other. My accounts of the concepts of rationality, impartiality, and morality explain their central and coherent use by thoughtful people in everyday life. I intend to describe, not revise these concepts. I am concerned with the actual coherent employment of these concepts, not with what philosophers and others say about them. When a rational person uses only those beliefs that are shared by all rational persons (what I call rationally required beliefs), I show that impartial rational persons share a common attitude toward morality. Even with this limitation to rationally required beliefs, I acknowledge that not all rational persons agree on all of their moral decisions and judgments, but I try to show that they agree on the general moral system or framework that they use in making these moral decisions and judgments. However, if a rational person uses idiosyncratic beliefs, e.g., religious beliefs, there may be no way to reach agreement about morality, even among impartial rational persons. Whenever I talk about all rational persons agreeing, I mean all rational persons who use only rationally required beliefs. I justify common morality by showing how it is related to the concepts of rationality and impartiality, but I do not derive morality from these two concepts. I provide a detailed description of morality before I attempt to justify it. My justification has force because the analyses of rationality, impartiality, and morality are each accurate descriptions of the basic concepts as they are commonly employed. That my descriptions of these three concepts clarify how these concepts are related to each other in such an intimate way not only shows that common morality is justified, it also supports my analyses of the three concepts.