Précis of Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue*

Abstract

In this book, I argue that there is a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. The book is at once an interpretation of Kant and an assertion that Kant's understanding of virtue particularly his rehabilitation of the virtue of humility is philosophically preferable.1 Part I is devoted to explaining the account of human nature upon which Kantian virtue is built, and then explaining that account of virtue. At the heart of Kant's conception of human nature are two assertions: a non-Stoic dependence upon things outside of us (the Dependency Thesis) and radical evil (the Corruption Thesis). It is the particular challenge of the Kantian virtuous person to come to terms with both her dependence and corruption. Virtue is based in a meta-maxim of the will (the of the moral disposition) which overturns our original corruption, thus assuring a strong unity of the virtues. Yet, when various aspects of this maxim are internalized in one's person, we can also speak of individual virtues in the more familiar Aristotelian sense. I thus reject Onora O'Neill's more act-based account of Kantian virtue, insisting that Kant's ethics is equally concerned with act and agent.