PRAM: A Practical Sybil-Proof Auction Mechanism for Dynamic Spectrum Access With Untruthful Attackers

Abstract

Auction is becoming increasingly popular for dynamic spectrum access (DSA), while it is extremely vulnerable to sybil attacks. Existing studies on sybil-proof DSA auction impractically assume that attackers bid truthfully based on true appraisals. This paper, for the first time, considers untruthful attackers and investigates the sybil-proof auction design in such more hazardous scenarios. To justify the new assumption, we first show that attackers obtain higher utilities by bidding untruthfully, especially in networks with inadequate channels. Based on this novel finding, we then design a practical sybil attack model named EqualSumBid Sybil, where attackers follow an equal-sum rule (i.e., the sum bid value of the multiple identities of an attacker equals the bid value when it bids with only one identity) instead of their true appraisals. To ensure efficient DSA under the new attack, we finally propose the PRAM, a Practical sybil-pRoof Auction Mechanism, where suspicious identity merging and bid-independent bidder sorting methods are introduced to alleviate the effect of untruthfulness on spectrum auction. Furthermore, winner selection and payment methods are designed to resist the EqualSumBid Sybil attack. Theoretical analyses and numerical results show that PRAM not only resists the EqualSumBid Sybil attack but also achieves individual rationality and truthfulness.