Pragmatist Egalitarianism

Abstract

Pragmatist Egalitarianism argues that a deep impasse plagues philosophical egalitarianism, and sets forth a conception of equality rooted in American pragmatist thought that successfully mediates that impasse. The book argues that there is a division within egalitarianism between those who regard equality as a fundamentally distributive ideal and those who construe it as a normative conception of human relationships. These rival conceptions are referred to as “vertical” and “horizontal” egalitarianism, respectively. Despite their close connection, these ideals may come apart. And yet, so much philosophical writing on equality is marked by what looks like a zero-sum competition for the same conceptual turf, as if the whole truth about equality must be captured by a single idea or an exclusive set of principles. One of the book’s core arguments is that we should reject the central premises upon which such disagreement turns: that equality is a single idea, that it has a fundamental locus, and that there is a singular or primary route to the achievement of a genuinely egalitarian society. The pragmatist view the book sets forth recasts egalitarianism in light of three mutually reinforcing variables—the institutional, the personal, and the cultural—each of which is best accentuated in one of a trio of pragmatists, John Dewey, William James, and Richard Rorty. If the three variables are mutually complicit in promoting inequality, an egalitarianism that takes this seriously will treat all three as equally (though differently) important in making things better.