Pragmatism, Causal Explanation, and Normative Facts

Abstract

The term ‘epistemology’ refers to two rather different practices.’ Construed broadly, it is our actual epistemic practice. That is, it is the practice common in every field from chemistry to philosophy, of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, scientific methods as rational or irrational, etc., and of evaluating and revising not only those beliefs, but the standards of evaluation themselves. Construed more narrowly, it is explicit theorizing about epistemology in the broad sense. This theorizing can be the attempt to construct a set of formal conditions for the justification of beliefs (e.g., explanatory coherence among beliefs; proper inferential relation to foundational beliefs; proper causal genesis, a la reliabilism, etc.); or it can merely be an attempt to uncover some of the features of justification and knowledge, without any commitment to the possibility of formal theorizing. Epistemology in the narrow sense is in essence our practice of theorizing about epistemology in the broad sense, about our practice of epistemology. We can be committed to the viability of epistemology in the broad and the narrow sense, and think that we can make true theoretical claims about justification and knowledge, without necessarily thinking that we can construct a formal theory of justification. Similar comments can be made about the term ‘morality’: this term can be construed broadly, as our practice of praising certain acts and traits and condemning others; or it can be construed narrowly, as our practice of theorizing about morality in the broad sense.