Pragmatism as a Mediator – Seeking an Illusory Harmony?

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines the well-known pragmatist claim to mediate between philosophical disputes. While recognizing the reconciliatory and harmonizing role that pragmatism plays in traditional debates between, for example, realism and antirealism, naturalism and culturalism, or science and religion, it is argued that the pragmatist also needs to acknowledge that there are situations in which no such mediation is reasonably possible, such as the conflict between racism and antiracism. The metaphilosophical question to be raised is how – in terms of pragmatism itself – we are able to distinguish between these different cases and what exactly it means to apply the pragmatic method to resolving this meta-level issue. Pragmatism here emerges as a thoroughly fallible and antifoundationalist reflexive inquiry into what it means, and what it ought to mean, for us to view philosophical issues in terms of their conceivable practical consequences. The project of mediation must be subordinated to this more fundamental understanding of pragmatist methodology.