Pragmatism and Epistemic Democracy

The problem ofjustifying democracy arises when a society sees the need for cooperative, collective action. Collective action may be needed to solve coordination problems, public goods problems, Prisoner's Dilemmas, and other structural problems of human interaction or perhaps to realize common ideals of justice in concrete political institutions. Once the need for collective action is established, one must ask how the goals of a cooperative endeavor are to be secured. Cooperation requires that individuals, at least over a specified range of activity, pursue a joint strategy. To assure voluntary compliance in a joint venture, cooperation must be to each person's advantage. However, each person may have an incentive to induce others to cooperate and to defect from the joint strategy in the hope of enjoying the fruits of cooperation without incurring the opportunity costs of compliance. This is the essence of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and considerations of this sort suggest that if collective action is to succeed, policies or strategies formed collectively must be coercively enforceable. Coercion, however, requires justification. Because solving the problem of rational noncompliance requires that collective decisions be coercively enforceable, the rules by which collective decisions are reached require justification. Douglas Rae neatly puts the problem of justification that emerges when political solutions are coercively enforceable as follows: "Once a political community has decided which of its members are to participate directly in the making of collective policy, an important question remains: 'How many of them must agree before a policy is imposed on the community?"" This is essentially the question to which the principle of democratic rule provides an answer: by what process are collective decisions to be made? Answering Rae's question requires a normative framework. We could say that a procedure for making collective decisions is justified if and

The article joins the current debate between epistemic and procedural democrats in contemporary democratic theory and aims to put epistemic democracy on a more secure footing. Yet, unlike those who explore the question from the bottom-up by analyzing the relationship between “truth” and the “fact of disagreement” within the context of domestic political discourse, I adopt a top-down approach animated by political realism and situate democracy within the actual world that we live in: a competitive ecology of states and regimes. The article thus has two purposes. For those who are interested in the recent revival of realism in political theory, it shows how it can be combined with both the epistemic paradigm in democratic theory and the realist research program in international relations, including the neo-positivist strand that has dominated the field over the past four decades. And for those who see themselves as epistemic democrats, it provides a powerful realist argument to defend their conception of democratic authority against criticisms made by procedural democrats.

One of the most powerful but elusive motifs in pragmatist philosophy is the idea that a liberal democracy should be understood as a community of inquirers. This paper offers a critical appraisal of a recent attempt to make sense of this intuition in the context of contemporary political theory, in what may be called pragmatist political liberalism (PPL). Drawing together ideas from Rawlsian political liberalism, epistemic democracy and pragmatism, proponents of PPL argue that the pragmatist conception of inquiry can provide a satisfying interpretation of the idea of justificatory neutrality as it appears in political liberalism. This is contrasted with Dewey's understanding of the epistemic character of democracy, which is viewed as unacceptably sectarian. This paper identifies and criticizes the two principal lines of argument made in support of PPL: the clarification argument and the fixation argument. Neither of these lines of argument, it is argued, passes the test each sets itself. I argue that the latter closes down the epistemic openness in the justification of democracy that is central to pragmatism.

This seventeenth issue of Democratic Theory marks a major shift for the journal: this will be its last general issue until further notice. We have received many excellent special issue proposals and have also developed various special issues internally in order to speak to unfolding events and current scholarly developments. Given the journal has two issues per year, this has meant Democratic Theory no longer has space in the years to come for unsolicited, single-article submissions. We are excited about the direction this takes us, opening as it does far more opportunity for concerted dialogue and collective inquiry on timely themes, particularly given platforms for special issues can be rare in the discipline. We welcome future proposals for special issues and look forward to those already in development contributing to the broader conversations in contemporary democratic theory.

John Stuart Mill was a British 19th century philosopher, who’s work in the area of liberty is well known. His work on democracy, on the other hand is not. This thesis reviews Mill’s work through the lens of procedural and epistemic democracy, asking what elements of Mill’s philosophy could be considered having attributes of each. The aim of this thesis is to better understand Mill’s view on democracy and his values. He had a clear belief in liberty and equality, but the extent of these beliefs has not yet been examined. Procedural and epistemic democracy allow for these attributes of his work to be analysed. Chapter one is devoted to introducing the concepts of procedural and epistemic democracy. Procedural democracy favours processes rather than outcomes. Epistemic democracy, on the other hand, is more concerned with outcomes. Epistemic democrats see democracy as a search for public opinion and an underlying ‘truth’ amongst the body politic. Through methods such as broad participation in democracy and discussion this can be found. Chapter two considers the procedural elements of Mill’s democratic theory. Mill, who favoured liberty, representative government, and participation, demonstrates some of these elements. His ideas on weighted voting, amongst others points, mean however that he could not be considered purely as a procedural democrat. Chapter three considers the epistemic elements of Mill’s democratic theory. It is argued that two areas of Mill’s work, his belief in free speech and public participation, are inherently epistemic. A third area, Mill’s belief in representative government may not be. This thesis argues, however, that representative government could be considered epistemic. This thesis ultimately shows that Mill’s thought contains elements of both theories as well as contradictory elements.

This chapter illustrates the deeply entrenched prejudice of political philosophers, including some democratic theorists, against “the rule of the dumb many.” It offers a critical literature survey showing how most traditional approaches to democracy either deny or circumvent the question of the people's competence to rule, with the exception of a tiny but growing literature on “epistemic democracy.” In fact, with the exception of the latter, the question of the cognitive competence of average citizens and the related question of the performance of democratic institutions either raises profound skepticism or is avoided altogether in contemporary democratic theory, both positive and normative. As a result, many theories and justifications of democracy tend to be competence insensitive, either denying that citizens' political incompetence is a problem or circumventing what they do see as a problem through an “elitist” definition of democracy as rule by the elected enlightened.

Disrupting the image of the Westphalian state system poses fundamental problems for democratic theory. Today, societies are linked in ways that undermine assumptions of national autonomy and public self-determination that have traditionally underpinned our thinking about modern democracy. Of course, as noted in the previous chapter, Westphalian norms of political autonomy and sovereign equality have never adequately described political reality in many nation-states. In postcolonial states, for instance, the harmonious image of autonomous national publics and cooperative economic interdependence endorsed by some liberals contrasts vividly with somewhat bleaker histories of domination, political intervention and economic marginalization. Indeed, many citizens of post-colonial states would most likely agree with Jean-Jacques Rousseau that economic interdependence creates a world of conflict, exploitation and ‘destructive vices’ for their nations (Hoffmann and Fidler 1991: xxxv). From this perspective, contemporary democratic theory seems to be founded on a historical connection to the nation-state that reflects the relatively high but gradually eroding levels of political autonomy of powerful Euro-American publics. Thus, at the same time as contemporary trends indicate a pressing need for transnational democracy, the inadequacy of long-standing assumptions in democratic theory suggests we need to rethink our basic concepts.KeywordsPolitical CommunityPolitical RepresentationDeliberative DemocracyDemocratic PoliticsDemocratic TheoryThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

‘Interest’ is a central concept in contemporary liberal political theory. Much of this discussion is marked by related confusions between ‘interest’ and ‘actions‐in‐interests’ and between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ interests. These confusions are damaging, since liberal theorists are ostensibly firmly opposed to treating objective interests as politically relevant, but they inevitably finish up admiting the relevance of some form of objective interests. They do this by limiting valid interest judgements to those which are rational, or which favour future over present interests, or which are made post facto, or which favour public over individual interests. This admission of objective interests into liberal theory has important implications for the way in which liberal theorists conceive of relationships between the liberal democratic state and its citizens. In particular, it seriously undermines the democratic element in contemporary liberal democratic theories of political representation.

NE of the persistent problems in contemporary democratic theory has been to specify the proper relationship(s) of democratic ideals to actual political practices. This problem is often expressed in the form of a dilemma between the demands of democratic ideals and empirical constraints on their realization. For example, Margolis argues that, It may not be possible to develop a theory of liberal democracy which is compatible with both the empirically demonstrated capabilities of the citizenry and the theoretically demonstrated necessity of preserving liberal values (1979: 93). There seems to be an inevitable trade-off between making democratic theory or practical, on the one hand, and fulfilling democratic ideals, on the other. If we allow empirical research to constrain our ideals by leading us to underestimate what is possible, then we may undercut those ideals and fail to use them to guide us in improving the political system. If we insulate our ideals from empirical evidence and analysis, then we may be merely building elegant but wholly unrealistic and useless analytical systems. This problem is not unique to democratic theory. Any ideals or ideologies simultaneously express the way someone thinks the world does work, should work, and even might work if social and political behavior and institutions were changed. The problem arises when the world does not conform to these expectations. In the face of discrepancies between ideals and reality, one might cling to the former believing that the contrary evidence is merely an aberration or a misinterpretation. Or, more aggressively, it might be demanded that the world itself be changed to conform more closely to the ideal pattern. On the other hand, the collision of ideals and facts may prompt an adjustment in what one believes can and should be done. This latter strategy is often what is anticipated by the injunction to be realistic in political and moral affairs, i.e., to temper or modify our moral expectations on the basis of a clear view of empirical evidence and practical possibility. The appeal to realism is thus not unique to arguments in democratic theory but may be used for or against relatively narrow policies or the broadest world views.'

An emerging branch of political theory, ‘the politics of dissensus’, starts out from the premise that in order to understand the politics of constitutional democracies, one needs to focus on parliamentary politics, which compromises both institutional settings and debates. Politics takes place among adversaries, and dissensus and argumentation pro et contra is the rule. The focus on the conditions for consensus in contemporary democratic theory accordingly misses the essence of politics. The politics of dissensus tends to think that the political philosophy inaugurated by John Rawls, political liberalism in particular, is too idealistic and utopian to capture real parliamentary politics. I argue that this basic objection against political liberalism is misconceived. To the contrary, the politics of dissensus and political liberalism supplement each other. The impact of my argument is that research in these disparate fields of political studies ought to enlighten each of them.

This chapter defends the claim that being-ruled — that is, the spectatorial engagement with politics characterized by involvement without participation — is a form of citizenship that is extremely prevalent within 21st-century conditions, yet nonetheless something that has been neglected by the major discourses constituting the contemporary study of democracy. Sections 2.2 through 2.4 discuss Aristotle's theory of being-ruled and argue that whereas Aristotle might have had good reason for giving the citizen-being-ruled only slight attention within his democratic theory, modern institutions and moral commitments ought to elevate the figure of the citizen-being-ruled to a position of primacy. Yet the relevance of being-ruled has not been appreciated by modern democratic theorists. Sections 2.5 through 2.8 review the most influential perspectives within contemporary democratic theory — including civic behavior research, pluralism, and deliberative democracy — and demonstrate the systematic neglect of the citizen-spectator. Finally, Section 2.9 addresses what it would mean to develop a democratic theory oriented around the experience of being-ruled and how the plebiscitary model defended in the subsequent chapters affords respect to the citizen-spectator.

Democratic Faith. By Patrick J. Deneen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. 440p. $45.00. Contemporary democratic theory has been flourishing. Recent liberal, communitarian, republican, deliberative, agonistic, pluralist, postmodern, cosmopolitan, cyberspace, and realist models and theories abound. Patrick Deneen's book is a significant contribution to this genre and original in its critical focus on those democratic theories that “insist upon the possibility of democratic transformation” and advance “a conception of human beings as both infinitely malleable and ameliorable” (p. 4).

Contemporary democratic theorists focus on democratic processes to the exclusion of the substantive goods which motivated their predecessors. This undermines the legitimacy of democracy, especially in an era of emerging democracies. This article critiques underlying deficiencies in contemporary theory and prescribes revisiting early modern, natural-law-based democratic theory exemplified by John Locke. Locke argued that the ultimate legitimacy of democratic processes depends on their serving the good of the people, as distinct from the will of the people. The authors argue that this conclusion is unavoidable, because it is impossible for democratic legitimacy to rest ultimately on any kind of process at all, even a democratic process. Legitimacy must rest on a substantive norm used to govern (create or repair) processes. Contemporary democratic theory seems unwilling to revisit this important problem.

The core of Karl Popper's theory of democracy is re-examined here in light of some of his most recent thoughts on the subject. His discussion of the paradox of democracy contributes a novel – though ultimately unsuccessful – argument to current debates between right-based and goal-based theories of democracy. His theory is also of political interest in a world with so many emerging democracies, because he is much more concerned than most contemporary democratic theorists with the morality and politics of fragile and unstable democratic systems. Nevertheless, his provocative discussion of the dangers of democracies being voted out of existence fails to advise democrats on how to prevent such a situation or on what to do should one arise.

How can civic education in a liberal democracy give social diversity its due? Two complementary concerns have informed a lot of liberal thinking on this subject. Liberals like John Stuart Mill worry that "the plea of liberty" by parents not block "the fulfillment by the State of its duties" to children. They also worry that civic education not be conceived or conducted in such a way as to stifle "diversity in opinions and modes of conduct."' Some prominent contemporary theorists add a new and interesting twist to these common--concerns. They criticize liberals like Mill and Kant for contributing to one of the central problems, the stifling of social diversity, that they are trying to resolve.2 The comprehensive liberal aim of educating children not only for citizenship but also for individuality or autonomy, these political liberals argue, does not leave enough room for social diversity. Would a civic educational program consistent with political liberalism accommodate significantly more social diversity than one guided by comprehensive liberalism?3 Political liberals claim that it would, and some recommend political liberalism to us largely on this basis. This article shows that political liberalism need not, and often does not, accommodate more social diversity through its civic educational program than comprehensive liberalism. Section I examines the defining difference between political and comprehensive liberalism and suggests why we might expect to find a significant difference in the accommodation of social diversity by political and comprehensive liberalism through civic education.